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The European Parliament objected to the PNR Agreement at nearly every point of the process." Just a few months after the PNR Agreement took effect, the European Parliament filed suit against the Council and Commission of the EU challenging the legality of the PNR claiming it was a direct violation of the privacy and data protection rights guaranteed by Directive 95/46/EC.1 4 In 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the PNR of 2004 for lack of legal basis 15 which, in short, was more of a procedural ruling than a substantive one.1 6 As such, the Commission, after being given leeway for an interim agreement," simply changed the agreement to give them the appropriate legal basis while leaving everything pertaining to the actual data transference the same and signed this 'new' PNR agreement with the United States in 2007 to run through 2013. 18 The legality of the 2007 PNR Agreement was never been challenged in the ECJ because, being based outside of the first pillar, the European Parliament did 15. Id. at 1-4831. Prior to the current status of the EU Treaties, the EU had a pillar structure with 3 pillars representing different competences granted to different institutions of the European Communities (Union). The EP only had authority to challenge legislation that was enacted in the first pillar. The Commission then changed the legal basis from the first pillar, which would have fallen under the 95/46 Directive, to another pillar. For a more indepth explanation of the former pillar structure, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in depth/ europe/euro-glossary/1216944.stm. Agreement due to a failure to ratify it prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. 21 The Treaty of Lisbon granted all international agreements, including the 2007 PNR Agreement, a new legal basis requiring European Parliament's approval in addition to a Council Decision in order to take effect. 22 In their new role, while retaining their disdain for the previous EU-US PNR agreements, the European Parliament refused to 23 approve the 2007 PNR Agreement which forced new negotiations.
Due to the general sentiment in the EU towards openness in government and politics, the draft of the new PNR Agreement was made available for scrutiny prior to its eventual approval. 24 However, there was also a confidential report from the legal advisors of the Commission touting the negotiated PNR Agreement as illegal 25 which was leaked to the media. An agreement was eventually reached between the EU and the United States which was ratified by the European Parliament and Council 27 and entered into force on July 1, 2012.28 What this report brought to light was that the terms of the proposal, which comprised the terms of the 2012 Agreement, are still at odds with EU law regarding data privacy and protection, perhaps even more so than the 2007 PNR Agreement which was 21 . Hans Graux, Belgian Passenger Name Record Approval Act Survives Legal Challenge on Procedural Grounds, TIME.LEx (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.timelex.eu/en/ blog/detail/belgian-passenger-name-record-approval-act-survives-legal-challenge-on-proceduralgrounds. (FLY) ANYWHERE BUT HERE 483 previously applied. 2 9 One major reason for the strong conflict is the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon which took place in December of 2009. 30 An important attribute of the Treaty of Lisbon is that it gives the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) legally binding effect. 31 The legal service for the EU Commission stated in its confidential memo that the terms of the draft agreement violate some of the fundamental rights which the CFR confers upon EU citizens. 32 The terms in the finalized 2012 Agreement are identical to the 2011 Proposed Agreement and thus the Commission Legal Service's memo is still relevant. In addition to this bout with the reality that the new agreement may infringe on fundamental rights, the European Parliament, which has been persistently critical of PNR agreement's with the United States since the inception of negotiations in 2003, now has more authority in these decisions than prior to the Lisbon Treaty.
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D. The Scope of This Note
Part II of this Note discusses the history and general sentiment of privacy and data protection in both the EU and the United States. This discussion includes a brief historical analysis of the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks, laws which relate to data protection and privacy in general, and laws developed which are pertinent to the debate concerning PNR. The purpose of this historical segment is to support an analysis of the laws and PNR agreements as well as to aid in making proposals for the resolution of the current PNR dilemma.
Part III provides an in-depth analysis of EU and US law which affect the PNR dialogue. In addition, this part examines both the 2007 PNR Agreement and the 2012 Agreement in light of the changes made to primary EU law by the Treaty of Lisbon, including the binding authority of the CFR.
In Part IV, building off of the analysis of Parts II and III, three possible options are discussed for the future of EU-US PNR agreements whereby one is recommended as the best solution to the current problem. 
29.
EU AND US.
A. US -History and General Sentiment toward Privacy and Data Protection
1. 9/11 and the Reactionary Legislation "September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States." 34 On that fateful day, nineteen hijackers boarded planes on the eastern seaboard headed for the west coast under the orders and orchestration of Usama Bin Laden and his terrorist group, al-Qaeda.
3 5 The death toll was astonishing, surpassing that of December 1941, when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. 36In all, nearly 3,000 people lost their lives that day. 37 Shortly thereafter, in November 2001, then President George W. Bush ordered an extensive investigation into the events of, and those leading up to, the attacks: The 9/11 Commission.
Perhaps most astonishingly, the events that transpired September 11 were seemingly quite preventable. As the 9/11 Commission stated, "The nation was unprepared." 3 9 The attackers and the plot by a group of extremists exploited major gaps in security and information sharing within the United States. The hijackers were 19 for 19 getting through the security checkpoints at the various airports. 40 The US authorities had ample information and intelligence, but no one could connect the dots. " [N] o analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground."41 As the 9/11 Commission found in their research of the events: In addition, part of this attack was comprised of "a cell of expatriate Muslim extremists who had clustered together in Hamburg, Germany."
43
The so-called 'Hamburg Cell' made extensive use of air travel dating from a few years prior to 9/11 up to the time they boarded their final flights.4
In order to remedy the vulnerabilities in the system of aviation security and data collection and transfer, the 9/11 Commission made several suggestions including "expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identities by the CAPPS screening system, deploying federal air marshals domestically, hardening cockpit doors, [and] alerting air crews to a different kind of hijacking possibility than they had been trained to expect.A5 The plan behind these suggestions was to "[t]arget terrorist travel.. .Develop strategies for neglected parts of our transportation security system... [P]revent arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying vital improvements in the "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists.. .Determine.. .guidelines that integrate safeguards for privacy and other essential liberties."
The legislative response to the inquiry regarding how to amend these vulnerabilities in order to protect the United States and its citizens was the enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001(ATSA). 47 The ATSA requires that airlines submit the PNR for all flights into, out of, or within the United States to the United States Customs and Border Patrol (USCBP). 4 8 Essentially, this means pretty much every flight that enters US airspace. PNR data includes such things as "passengers' names, credit card information, and even meal preferences."A 9 Failure of the airline to comply with the US requirement could result in rather large fines of up to $5000 per passenger. 50 At most, the United States can refuse to allow the airplane to land on US soil at all and may even revoke the landing privileges of that airline." 
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General US Sentiment Toward Privacy
The United States generally has a quite different view and sentiment of privacy than that of other countries, especially those countries which are Member States in the EU. There is the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution which protects a person from an unwarranted search and 52 seizure. However, as this amendment was written in 1791 and is not incredibly precise, attempting to apply it to the modem day computer-age notion of data and privacy protection can be quite problematic at times. There is also the judicial right to privacy, most notably upheld in the Supreme Court cases Griswold v. ConnecticutS3 and Roe v. Wade. 5 4 But, there is no real 'right' of privacy in the United States, per se, which is to say there is no fundamental right to privacy. This framework, as will be discussed, is quite different than that of the EU.
The United States employs the sectoral approach to privacy. This basically means that the United States protects privacy on a point-by-point basis, picking and choosing when and where to employ privacy protection.
5 5 For the most part, Americans are generally more willing to barter privacy freedoms for security than are Europeans which is in large part due to the sectoral approach of American privacy laws. As one commentator puts it, "The United States' sectoral approach is more reactive in nature . . . . [T] he United States allows the market to decide how much privacy is needed, and the public generally has limited statutory rights." 5 6 The words of David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy at the DHS, support this sentiment:
Passengers have a right to privacy and protections of their civil liberties and personal information, but also have a right to know that their government is doing everything it can to ensure their safety and security when they board an airplane. It is necessary, therefore, to ensure the continued use of proven and effective security measures. PNR is a proven asset in the fight against terrorism and other transnational crimes.
The United States really has only one piece of legislation that has a broad, blanketing effect with regard to data privacy and that is the Privacy Act of 1974.58 This "single, wide-ranging data privacy law in the United States--the Privacy Act of 1974--restricts the use of personal data held by federal agencies. The Act requires federal agencies to apply 'fair information practices' to all agency policies regarding personal data sharing."" Even in this 'broad' legislation, there are some equally broad exceptions which punch holes in its effect. "The Privacy Act, however, does permit the disclosure of personal data for 'routine use' and subsequent interpretations of that provision have significantly weakened the effectiveness of the law.", 60 The 'routine use' exception, as time passes and it is construed more broadly, will continue to erode any of the encompassing effect it would have had. As a consequence, the exception may possibly become the rule.
Not even a week after the 9/11 attacks, the willingness of the United States to trade-off privacy and data rights in exchange for national security became quite apparent. Congress, at this time, proposed legislation "to expand the surveillance and investigative powers of federal law enforcement agencies." 6 The result was enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("PATRIOT Act"). 62 The PATRIOT Act greatly increased the ability of federal agencies to gather and transfer massive amounts of personal data. 63 Further, this legislation also restricted both public oversight and the public's power to contest the data collection.6 Ambiguity in the terms used in the PATRIOT Act expanded the variety of data that could be procured. 
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that the term 'tangible things' subject to FBI seizure under the USA PATRIOT Act included personal data such as purchase records, computer files, educational records, library records, and genetic information."
66
Congress did attempt to rein in the expansive collection of personal data to protect individual privacy through the creation of privacy offices. 67 "The new offices, however, have done little of consequence and the push by the executive branch for information sharing has continued with only limited oversight from Congress and the Supreme Court." 68 Given the recent signing of a four-year extension to the PATRIOT Act, 69 it appears that this readiness to barter privacy for security is not in recession nor is it likely to be any time in the near future.
EU-History and General Sentiment toward Privacy and Data Protection
European countries and their citizens tend to have a much different view of privacy than do most Americans. "European standards on the protection of the right to privacy are significantly different from American standards, as demonstrated by the fact that the creation of the PNR system was met with much greater resistance in the EU than in the US." 70 From the inception of negotiations between the EU and the United States, the members of European Parliament, as well as many citizens of the EU, were adamantly against the idea." On the contrary, there was very little of this sentiment reciprocated across the pond.
A possible reason for this distinction between the EU and the United States with regard to privacy and data protection are the "historical roots." Nazis were renowned for their use of data collection in order to track and account for Jews which nearly allowed for the mass extermination of an entire race of people in Europe. After the fall of the Third Reich, citizens of Europe were then confronted by the autocratic Communist regimes which, as with the Nazis, relied heavily on data collection in order to squelch the voice of any threatening opposition. 74 (FLY) ANYWHERE BUT HERE Europeans were not directly subjected to these same regimes as the citizens of Eastern Europe, this procurement of data and the way in which the data was used was certainly feared by them. 75 Given the recent history, it is fairly easy to empathize with Europe's contra-US perspective concerning personal data as the United States has never been subjected to a similarly fascist dictatorship. As one commentator has advanced: "The atrocities that followed the abuse of personal data in Europe, and the fact that the US has not had similar negative experiences with data protection, makes the different conduct and attitude to the collection, storage, and use of PNR understandable." 7 6 Pursuant to the European position on the protection of data and privacy, it is reasonable to understand why, in the EU, privacy and data protection are applied through a very broad, comprehensive, and robust approach. First, both data protection and privacy are covered by encompassing legislation such as that of Directive 95/46.77 They were also given the status as fundamental rightS 78 after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 79 Well before the Treaty of Lisbon, several countries in Europe drafted and ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) thereby placing data protection and privacy in the context of human rights throughout Europe. 80 Second, the privacy guaranteed by these laws applies whenever and to or by whomever it is processed, transmitted, or stored. 8 1 It is not a case-by-case basis as a norm like that in the United States, but rather instilled in almost all contexts.
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Another distinction between the EU and United States in this regard is that, in the United States, "privacy interests on a scale [are] counterbalanced by free speech rights," while in the EU, they "analogize privacy rights with 75. Id As a result, the laws and legislation of the EU and Member States treat an individual's data as something in line with proprietary information. It was with the variant sentiments concerning data and privacy in combination with the reactionary post-9/11 US legislation, the EU and the United States entered into negotiations for a PNR scheme that would bring the air carriers flying from the EU to the United States in compliance with the ATSA. The Commission and the United States finally agreed to terms on an agreement in 200485 which was later annulled by the ECJ based on the challenge of the European Parliament that it was in direct violation of Directive 95/46. In the end, the ECJ annulled based on a technicality, an incorrect legal basis. The Commission, in response, simply moved the basis from the first to the third pillar which resulted in the European Parliament losing their voice and ability for legal challenge. 
III. ANALYSIS OF APPLICABLE EUROPEAN UNION LAW
A. Directive 95/46
Directive 95/46, passed in 1995, is the legislative embodiment of the European sentiment toward the protection of privacy and personal data. 91 The Data Protection Directive also further differentiated the approach of the EU to that of the United States with regard to the protection of data and data As is the case with all directives, the purpose of Directive 95/46 was to standardize pertinent legislation across all of the Member States. 95 To accomplish this, the Directive "proposes strict requirements on the processing of personal data."
96 The Directive states:
[A]ny processing of personal data must be lawful and fair to the individuals concerned [.] ..
[I]n particular, the data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to The Directive further provides that "in order to be lawful, the processing of personal data must in addition be carried out with the consent of the data subject or be necessary... for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest [.] " 98 The latter portion of this provision potentially allows for a lot of discretion. So long as the personal data is necessary for the greater public interest, the directive seems to allow its process. However, to curtail the use of such a gap, the directive states that "data... capable... of infringing fundamental freedoms or privacy should not be processed unless the data subject gives his explicit consent [.] 
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by personal consent of the subject, personal data may be processed in "compliance with a legal obligation."' 0 0 Lastly, the Member States are prohibited from processing of the so called 'sensitive data' which includes "racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life."'o'
Directive 95/46 does permit the transfer to personal data to third countries, but only if that nation "ensures an adequate level of protection." 1 0 2 It also mandates that "the transfer of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection must be prohibited [.] " 10 3 The Directive further requires that "the adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country must be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the transfer operation or set of transfer operations [.] " 04 In the event the Commission finds that any country provides inadequate data protection, the Member States are strictly prohibited from transferring any personal data to that country until the Commission, through negotiation, can fix the issues. 105 Interestingly, the United States was found to be one such country which did not provide adequate protection of European data which required the approval of certain safe harbor provisions for commercial transactions.1 06 A major concern for the EU regarding the Directive was oversight to ensure that the directive was being applied correctly and that no circumvention of the law took place which is both evidenced and alleviated by Articles 28 and 29.107 Article 28 requires that every Member State establish its own independent enforcement body.' 0 o Article 29 establishes a Working Party on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. 109 The Article 29 Working Party is comprised of a representative from each Member State, a representative for the Community, and one from the Commission."o This is an independently working group that has an advisory capacity on the nature of data protection." 1 1 The Working Party may give an opinion on any act or legislation affected by the Directive whether or not they are expressly asked 100. Id This provision grants a wide exemption. Basically, anything that falls outside of Community law, meaning the first pillar (in the former pillar structure), was exempt. With the fall of the pillar structure brought on by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon," 7 the processing of data pursuant to or for the necessity of public security, defense, security, and criminal law remains part of this exemption."' 8 However, for other reasons, discussed later, this exemption may not matter in the context of PNR Agreements between the EU and the United States.
B. 2004 PNR and 2006 Annulment
When the United States enacted the ATSA, the laws of two powers on each side of the Atlantic Ocean were placed into immediate conflict with 
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493 one another. Meanwhile, European airlines were stuck in the middle between a figurative 'rock and a hard place' because no matter which path they chose, they would have been subject to a fine.11 9 "The airlines that complied with the ATSA by transferring passenger data violated EU privacy laws; however, refusal to transmit the data to U.S. authorities meant facing fines and the possible revocation of landing rights." 1 2 0 The airline companies had to transmit or allow the US authorities access to the data either before or shortly after takeoff and the fine for refusal to comply could reach as much as $5,000 per passenger.12' From a purely financial perspective, the European airlines were left without any real choice in this matter seeing that compliance with EU law would have led to massive losses to the airlines through the stiff monetary penalty and potential loss of landing privileges. However, a major point of contention for the countries was the Commission's decision on the adequacy of US protection of EU citizens' data. The Commission's decision was based almost exclusively on a letter from the USCBP to the Commission detailing what they would undertake in the gathering and processing of PNR data. (FLY) ANYWHERE BUT HERE based on a 'pull' instead of 'push' system ... .128
The Article 29 Working Party believed that the sheer amount of data that was requested was unnecessary to the function to which it would serve.
129
They were also quite concerned about the USCBP having access to the European airlines' reservation systems and taking the data as opposed to the airlines transmitting the data to the USCBP.1 30 Despite this, the Commission, pursuant to the former Article 300 of the Treaty of the European Community, submitted the agreement with the United States to the European Parliament for a consultation based on their own decision that the USCBP "provid[ed] an adequate level of protection." 13 The European Parliament delayed in giving their opinion on the adequacy of the Agreement despite the Council requesting an urgent opinion.
13 2 Two weeks after the Commission's submission, the European Parliament adopted a resolution detailing its apprehension to the proposed agreement and asked the Commission to draft a new agreement. 133 As the European Parliament had refused to give their opinion on the adequacy of the Commission's draft decision, the Commission passed its decision on adequacy which the Council adopted on The ECJ annulled the 2004 PNR Agreement on the grounds that it lacked appropriate legal basis. 136 The 2004 PNR Agreement was based in the first pillar transport policy, but the ECJ held that since the agreement was for security and combating terrorism, it should fall under the public security framework, a third pillar provision.' 3 7 Article 3(2) of the Directive states that it "shall not apply to the processing of personal data... in the 
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course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law," meaning data processing that occurs outside the first pillar. 138 As such, the ECJ held that the Directive did not apply to the 2004 PNR Agreement or the adequacy decision, but that the Commission did not have the appropriate competence in the first pillar." 9 In essence, this was a purely procedural ruling and, unfortunately, appears to lend little to no substantive quality that could be applied to either the 2007 PNR Agreement or the 2011 Proposal, and thereby the 2012 EU-US PNR Agreement (2012 PNR Agreement), to determine their legality. "The ECJ did not take an explicit position on whether the PNR Agreement disproportionately encroached on the rights of EU citizens, but instead took an easier course and annulled the Council Decision and Commission Decision on formal grounds." 1 4 0 However, the ECJ annulment may not totally lack meaning. For instance, the ECJ began its opinion by citing to Article 8 of the ECHR which states the right to individual privacy and also "the circumstances in which a state may intervene with the right." 1 4 1 This was the first known instance of the ECJ doing anything of this nature by referring to an international human rights agreement as opposed to EU law, especially given that at that time the EU was not a party to the ECHR.1
42
There are a few possible theories as to why the ECJ would reference the ECHR. At the time of this ruling by the ECJ, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (EU Constitution) was in the ratification period.1 4 3
The EU Constitution would have given the EU legal personality'" and thus allowed the EU to accede to the ECHR.1 45 Therefore, it is possible that the ECJ was trying to be politically influential to push the ratification of the EU Constitution and express its view of accession to the ECHR. In addition, it is a quite reasonable assumption that the ECJ was predicting that in future PNR disputes, the ECHR's personal privacy provisions would play an important role. Under the amendments of the Treaty of Lisbon, the circumstances surrounding the 2006 and 2007 Agreements would be completely untenable. The amendments made to the Treaties collapsed the pillars into one, the first pillar, which thereby brings all Commission and Council action within the same competence as the European Parliament.' 57 In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon also eliminated the consultation procedure of legislative enactment, which resulted in very limited involvement by the European Parliament, and replaced it with the co-decision procedure. In short, the European Parliament, together with the Council, will decide on all actions which do not involve the common defense and security policy, which is more akin to military type action or prevention and does not include PNR, which falls under the Home Affairs Commission.
C. The Treaty ofLisbon
Treaties.1 4 7 Second, through the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU acceded to the ECHR thus bringing the institutions and all Member States within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).1 48 Third, the Treaty of Lisbon granted far more legislative and political power to the European Parliament by collapsing the three pillars of the EU, thereby eradicating the former pillar structure.1 4 9 Lastly, the European Parliament was further empowered by the Treaty of Lisbon by the change in the legislative process. Prior to the amendments, the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (EC Treaty) Article 251 called for the consultation method of passing legislation.so The Treaty of Lisbon changed this to a co-decision method requiring joint decision-making between the Council and the European Parliament
60
Another significant amendment to the Treaties made by the Treaty of Lisbon was adopting the CFR originally meant to be part of the EU Constitution, and further giving the CFR the status of primary EU law. "The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in 163 In addition, the limitation of a right must be proportional to the objective.
Data protection for an individual, after the Treaty of Lisbon, attained the status of a fundamental right pursuant to the CFR. Article 8 of the CFR states:
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
5
Even if Directive 95/46, for any reason, does not apply to PNR agreements or is somehow rendered less effective through gaps in the legislation or otherwise, the CFR will still be applicable and protect personal data. Thus, the PNR debate will hinge on whether the data is processed fairly, proportionately, and legitimately by law for the general interest.
Yet another important change made by the Treaty of Lisbon was EU accession to the ECHR.' 6 6 By the EU acceding to the ECHR, yet another layer and set of rights will take effect with regard to the EU itself. In 1950, the countries comprising the Council of Europe 1 6 7 met in Rome to draft, and eventually sign, the ECHR. 168 
2013] 499
Human Rights (ECtHR). 171 All Member States of the EU were already party to the ECHR prior to the Treaty of Lisbon and therefore the citizens of those Member States could challenge the actions of their own country on the basis of human rights violations in the ECtHR .172 After the Treaty of Lisbon, the citizens of the EU can challenge the actions of the EU directly, even when that action is to compel Member State action, as a violation of their individual human or fundamental rights.' 73 Although the Treaty of Lisbon mandates accession to the ECHR,1 74 actual accession by the EU to the ECHR has yet to occur. 175 As a consequence, a citizen can still challenge an EU act, but only to the extent that it is carried out in the national legislature; they cannot directly challenge any EU act in the ECtHR.1 7 6
Given the current status of the EU's official accession to the ECHR, in order for a citizen to challenge any PNR agreement in the ECtHR, there must be national law in place. This has created a rather difficult situation for the people of the EU because the 2007 PNR Agreement was not ratified prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 177 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and therefore the subsequent greater legislative powers of the European Parliament, the 2007 Agreement was never ratified by the Parliament.
1 78 As such, the 2007 Agreement was only provisionally applied pursuant to a 2007 Commission Decision "which rules that the Agreement should be provisionally applied pending its entry into force."l 7 9
Another issue with the provisional application in the context of the ECHR is that in order to open the gates to the ECtHR, one must exhaust all other judicial remedies: "The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted[.]" 80 For citizens of the EU, this requires the exhaustion of the national court system as well as in the ECJ. The ultimate result is that the fundamental and human rights of the citizens of the EU were placed in limbo in the context of an ECtHR. However, it does appear that accession of the EU is to come in the near future. There were a few important issues regarding the change from the first pillar to the third. "For one, in the third pillar the Parliament has even less voice than in the first pillar, so the result would be that the Parliament is effectively cut out of the picture. 88 The third pillar concerned "matters of policing and criminal law" and thus was not within the grasp of the Directive. 189 Third, the ECJ could also have been effectively excluded from ruling on PNR after the move to the third pillar.1 90 ECJ "jurisdiction over third-pillar matters depends on whether each member state has made a declaration permitting its national courts ... to refer questions to the ECJ on third pillar issues." 191 However, after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, these factors became much less relevant, and possibly irrelevant altogether.
Given that the 2007 Agreement was not ratified before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, it was only provisionally applied and thus it needed to be ratified by the European Parliament in order to be fully effective, which is to say "formally enforced. Article 6 sets out the basic principles dealing with data processing. With regard to PNR, the pertinent sections state: [and] kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed. 9 .
The first part of this is a matter of proportionality, which is a key component of the EU legal system. The information collected and processed must be proportional to the purpose for its collection, which is for security and to prevent terrorism and other types of organized crime. [Vol. The Article 29 Working Party further stated that, though "personal data can be valuable under certain circumstances," it still may not be enough to guarantee air travel security and that less intrusive measures should also be employed with regard to innocent passengers. 2 04 Given the excessive amount of data that were collected through the 2007 Agreement, it is possible that the volume did not fit within the framework of Article 6 of the Directive.
Article 8 provides that certain personal data, called sensitive data, cannot be processed except with the consent of the subject. 205 Such data includes "racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life." 2 06 The 2007 Agreement provided that the United States would automatically delete any such sensitive data that is included in any of the PNR data transferred to the DHS. 207 However, the United States still retained the ability to access that data "in exceptional case[s]" 20 8 or if it may threaten US interests. 209 Additionally, "the deletion of sensitive data applies only in principle, and in prac [t] In addition to the other articles, Article 12 directly correlated to the 2007 PNR Agreement. This article provides that the subject must have a right of access to the data collected concerning them and also that they have the right to rectify any error in that data which hearkens back to the requirement for the accuracy of data being processed in Article 8 of the Directive.
2 13 The obvious purpose for this provision was so that any and all data subjects could ensure and also be assured that the data being transferred which is identifiable to them is indeed correct.
The 2007 PNR Agreement did grant some access, stating, "Consistent with U.S. law, DHS also maintains a system accessible by individuals, regardless of their nationality or country of residence, for providing redress to persons seeking information about or correction of PNR." 2 14 This information, when requested, was to be "disclosed to the individual in accordance with the Privacy Act and the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)."
15
Even though the agreement provided for this right of access, US compliance with this provision may be lacking. In February of 2010, the DHS promulgated a final rule exempting the Automated Targeting System (ATS), the system where PNR data is stored, from the requirement for disclosure of the Privacy Act, even though this is a "flagrant violation of the DHS 'undertakings' and the DHS-EU 'agreement'." 2 16 On account of this, "non-US persons are not being afforded the greater access rights provided by the Privacy Act." 2 17 Even when explicitly requested on the basis of the Privacy Act, the information, if divulged at all, has only been done so in accordance with the FOIA, meaning only data that is required to be released by the FOIA is released. 218 According to a study by the Identity Project, none of the requests for PNR data have been performed by the DHS in accordance with the Privacy Act, only in accordance with the FOIA. 
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The noncompliance of the United States with regard to the right of access brings to light an imperative notion. Most of the 2007 Agreement, that is the promises or "assurances", were given by the United States in the form of a letter from Michael Chertoff, US Secretary of the DHS, to Luis Amado, President of the Council (DHS Letter).
22 ' Many of the specific provisions of the 2007 Agreement are contained in the DHS Letter, not the actual body of the Agreement itself.
2 22 However, the DHS Letter, which holds so many specifications, was not legally binding in nature. 223 As one scholar stated, "[I]t is significant that the processing, collection, use, and storage of personal data are not regulated by a bilateral agreement (or on international law), but only on the transient 'assurances' in the US Letter, which may change at any time." 2 2 4 The 2007 Agreement was anchored only " [o] n the basis of the assurances" which was rather problematic for the EU, or should have been seen as such.
225 This is further supported by a 2007 Resolution of the European Parliament which stated that the assurances "must become an integral part of the agreement and must be legally binding." 22 6 In addition to the aforementioned articles, Article 25 was a central point of contention as it allowed the transfer of data from the Member States to a third country, provided that the third country in question provided "an adequate level of protection."227 The criteria used in determining the adequacy of data protection of a third country included, most importantly, but not limited to, "the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations . . . the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question ... and security measures which are complied with in that country." 228 A couple of issues arose in the context of this Article when discussing the duration of data retention as well as the rule of law in the United States.
The DHS Letter stated that the United States had the authority to hold the PNR data of an individual for up to fifteen years; seven years in active status and eight years in dormant status. 229 Some scholars have been quite critical of the length of this retention period as it is nearly five times the length of retention provided for in the 2004 Agreement. 
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(FLY) ANYWHERE BUT HERE such an extensive retention period could be in violation of Article 6 of the Directive which states that data should be "kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which" the data were collected. 23 1 In contrast, the EU draft agreement with Australia only has a retention period of five and one-half years (three years active and two and one-half years dormant statuses) and a recent proposal for an EU PNR Directive only contained a retention period of a little over five years (thirty days active and five years dormant statuses).
2 32 Given that the 2007 Agreement was still almost three times the length as another EU PNR agreement and the proposed directive, it does appear it was unnecessary for the purpose served.
The 2007 Agreement applied the US Privacy Act protections to the data subjects involved in the PNR transfers. 233 However, "the Agreement does not afford full Privacy Act protections to the PNR data collected by DHS, other than the disclosure of data to individuals; thus, DHS will be permitted to share the data with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies." 234 In a sense, this means that the United States could do what they please with the data once they had received it. Further degrading the adequacy of protection, "[t]he US Privacy Act only protects its own citizens against abuse and incorrect use of personal data[.]" 235 It seems apparent that if an EU citizen has no legal rights to recourse on the basis of US law then their data would not be adequately protected by the United States.
In light of this information, it does not seem likely that the 2007 Agreement was in line with the provisions of Directive 95/46 mainly in regard to the lack of adequate protection of data in the United States. However, Articles 3 and 13 granted wide exemptions for data processing and use when its collection was a matter of security or defense. 236 Therefore, even though the Treaty of Lisbon, by collapsing the pillar structure, may have brought all PNR agreements within the first pillar and thus subject to the Directive, this may not be enough to protect the data subjects. 237 Given that the ECJ in their 2006 Decision held that the 2004 Agreement was for public security, it is very possible that they would have ruled similarly with regard to the 2007 Agreement, which would have exempted it from subjectivity to the Directive. 238 However, it must be noted that the Article 29 Working Party adamantly holds their ground that any 231. Directive 95/46, supra note 77, art. 6(1)(e) (emphasis added The CFR is quite explicit in its protection of privacy and data. Article 7 grants, "Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications." 243 In addition, Article 8 provides for protection of personal data, that all "data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law." 2 " Given their very nature as fundamental rights as well as their addition to Treaties pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon granting the CFR the same legal effect of primary EU law, there is no doubt that these rights are directly applicable to PNR.
5
As the Legal Service Report states, since the right to privacy and data protection are fundamental, any limitation of those rights must be proportional and necessary. Article 52 of the CFR specifically states:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to As has been demonstrated, security, which is the ECJ's stated purpose of PNR, could reasonably be considered to be 'general interest'.247 In addition, as a stated purpose is public security and because terrorism can potentially be a serious threat to human lives, PNR could be said to be a 'need to protect the rights and freedoms of others', specifically the Article 2 right to life 24 8 and the Article 6 right to security of person. 2 4 9 Therefore, the 2007 Agreement, as well as future PNR agreements, may lawfully limit the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection if proportional and necessary. The Article 29 Working Party has already deemed the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime necessary. 250 The Working Party "has always supported the fight against international terrorism and serious transnational crime" and "considers this fight necessary and legitimate."
251 This seems to be both a reasonable and agreeable view. Thus the issue of PNR agreements limiting fundamental rights of subjects comes down to proportionality.
The two main proportionality issues concerning the 2007 Agreement are retention period and the extent of the data. As stated previously, the retention period of the 2007 Agreement was an increase of nearly five times that of the 2004 Agreement, and three times that of the draft EU-Australian 252 TeE PNR Agreement.
The European Parliament refused to ratify this agreement partly on account of such a lengthy retention period. 253 Additionally, in the EU's own proposal for PNR for internal EU travel, the retention period was only five years. 254 The Article 29 Working Party stated that "retention periods should not be longer than necessary for the performance of the defined purpose." 2 5 Specifically, the Working Party finds that "[r]etention of data of non-suspected individuals raises the question of their necessity and might conflict with constitutional principles in some Member States." 25 6 It believes that unless the data of a passenger has triggered some sort of an investigation, it should be discarded immediately after analysis. 257 This short of a retention period may in actuality be too short and could possibly lower the working efficiency of 
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PNR systems in general. The Council Legal Service seems to believe that a retention period of two years is adequate for the purposes for which the data is held, but questioned the necessity of retention beyond that period. The shear breadth and amount of data that was collected and processed pursuant to the 2007 Agreement also raises the issue of proportionality. There were nineteen categories of data that were or could have been collected by the DHS through the 2007 Agreement. 260 However, some of these categories were very broad such as "General Remarks" which allowed more data to be collected under the guise of just one category. 261 i addition, the 2007 Agreement still allowed the collection of the so-called 'sensitive data' which included data revealing religious beliefs, racial origin, ethnic origins, or political opinions.
2
The issue is determining just how much information is needed to effectuate the purpose of PNR agreements to stop terrorism. The European Parliament has stated on at least two occasions that Advance Passenger Information (API) data is more than sufficient for the purpose served. 263 Also, the API data collection would be much less invasive on the personal privacy of data subjects than was the data collection in the 2007 PNR scheme. Lastly, it is the opinion of both the EDPS and the Article 29 Working Party that sensitive data should not be transferred to the DHS at all. 265 The EDPS specifically calls for a reduction of categories, including the broad categories like 'general remarks' as well as the 170 category named in the DHS Letter, 266 The usefulness of large-scale profiling on the basis of passenger data must be questioned thoroughly, based on both scientific elements and recent studies. Up to now the Working Party has not seen any information confirming the usefulness of such profiling. On the contrary, recent studies tend to establish the counter-productive character of such screening, especially in relation to the fight against terrorism.271
Therefore, since the amount of PNR data that is transferred to the DHS may neither be the least invasive nor necessarily the most effective means of accomplishing the purpose, it seems the logical progression that the amount of PNR data transferred pursuant to the 2007 Agreement was not proportional. In addition, the 2011 Proposal incorporates the 'push' method for data transfers, which was also previously covered by the DHS Letter. 28 0 These provisions, as with nearly all of the terms of the 2011 Proposal, were copied into the 2012 Agreement.
E. 2011 PNR Proposal and 2012 Agreement
1
Despite incorporating much of the DHS Letter into the legal framework of an agreement, the 2011 Proposal, and thereby 2012 Agreement, still fall below the legal standard required under EU law. For instance, although the 2012 Agreement does require the push method, there is still a wide exception that allows the DHS to acquire access to the carriers' systems "in order to respond to a specific, urgent, and serious threat[.]" 2 82 Additionally, the redress incorporated into Article 13, as with the 2007 Agreement, still "guarantees basically no judicial redress to data subjects, since all judicial redress is made subject to US law . . . [and] are administrative only and thus at the discretion of the DHS." 283 286 Based on the extradition agreement, a serious crime is one which is punishable by more than one year. 287 With such a low maximum penalty as well as the transnational requirement being met by simply occurring in or affecting more than one nation, 2 88 which will inevitably "include a very large number of crimes which cannot be regarded as serious [,] " the proportionality of the agreement is put into question.
89
Another major sticking point of the 2012 Agreement provision is that applying the extradition agreement definition of serious crimes seems repugnant as those individuals are already suspected or convicted of the crime whereas PNR relates to "a priori innocent individuals." 29 0 The 2012 Agreement changes this provision for the proposal slightly to include only " [o] ther crimes that are punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of three years or more and that are transnational in nature." 2 9 1 This is still a low enough penalty to raise the same issues mentioned in the Legal Service Report bringing proportionality into question.
The Legal Service also finds that the third clause of Article 4, which would allow PNR to be used in identifying persons that would be further questioned and scrutinized at the borders of the United States also "raises serious questions of proportionality." 2 92 This is simply a means of extending the USCBP's capabilities to police immigration offenses, possibly very minor offenses, not a means of preventing terrorism or serious transnational crime.293 Within that same Article, yet another provision drew the ire of the Commission's Legal Service. Subsection 2 of Article 4 would allow the DHS to use and process PNR "if ordered by a court." 2 94 The Legal Service finds that this cannot possibly be a meaningful limitation as it would allow the use of PNR for any purpose provided that the user could persuade a US The Legal Service does not consider such a provision to meet the requirement of foreseeability which the ECJ has held is needed to uphold the principle of a measure's being provided for by law. 297 One consistency between the 2012 Agreement and the 2007 Agreement is the retention period, which remains fifteen years.
2 9 8 However, the active period would be shortened to five years with a dormant period of ten years.
2 99 The proposal also provides that after six months, "PNR shall be depersonalized and masked [.] " 30 0 This is, quite simply, a hollow, empty promise of protection considering that the data could be 'demasked' by US authorities, albeit by "a limited number of specifically authorized officials."o 30 The ending result is the same in that the data can be 'repersonalized' and utilized after it is masked if the United States desires it to be so. The Legal Service does not find such a reduction of the active status period to be enough to scotch the same proportionality concerns as the 2007 Agreement's retention period as it "represents almost no improvement compared to the [2007] EU-US agreement, which the Parliament refused to approve . . . .302 Despite a shorter active period and access being more restricted in the dormant period, the data can still be accessed by US authorities. 303 The bottom line is that fifteen years of retention is quite incongruous with the requirement of proportionality.
On account of these major conflicts with fundamental rights and data protection laws in the EU, the Legal Service came "to the conclusion that despite certain presentational improvements, the draft agreement does not constitute a sufficiently substantial improvement of the agreement currently applied on a provisional basis, the conclusion of which was refused on data protection grounds by the European Parliament."
304 As a matter of fact, the Legal Service viewed the 2011 Proposal as "a setback from the point of view of data protection." 3 05 For these reasons, there is no doubt, at least in the eyes of the Legal Service, that the 2011 Proposal violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to EU citizens by the CFR. 306 Given that the IV. RECOMMENDATION Given the information available, there appear to be three options that the EU can authorize, two of which have already been shown to be untenable with regard to fundamental rights. First, the EU, through the actions of the European Parliament as well as the other bodies, could annul the 2012 Agreement and then ratify the 2007 Agreement. The second option for the EU is to accept the new status quo held in the terms 2012 Agreement. Given that the 2007 Agreement has many of the same proportionality issues as the 2011 Proposal and thus the 2012 Agreement, which the Commission Legal Service deemed to violate fundamental rights, it seems logical that the 2007 Agreement also violates fundamental rights. As such, neither of these two options should be entertained by the EU. The final and recommended option is for the European Parliament to annul the 2012 Agreement and then for the European Commission to negotiate a new bilateral agreement with the United States. This new bilateral agreement should be consistent with the basic principles of EU law and the fundamental rights guaranteed by the CFR which was incorporated into primary EU law by the Treaty of Lisbon.
Instead of the broad, sweeping categories and breadth of PNR data that is transferred pursuant to the 2007 Agreement, the new agreement should use the much less invasive API data. In addition to being less invasive to privacy, the EU already has the appropriate legal framework in place concerning API data and it would be fairly easy to apply when sending it to the United States while, more than likely still providing an adequate amount of security to counter terrorism efforts and transnational crime.
3 07 As the European Parliament has already stated:
[I]t would seem that in practice, for law enforcement and security purposes, Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) data are more than sufficient; these data are already collected in Europe in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2299/89 of 24 July 1989 on a code of conduct for computerized reservation systems, and may therefore be exchanged with the US under a comparable regime; behaviour data in the PNR seem to be of limited use, as they cannot be identified if not linked to APIS; the justification for the general transfer of PNR data is therefore not satisfactory [.] 308 Regardless of whether the same API data is acceptable to the United States, any new agreement must eliminate any transfer of sensitive data to the United States, which would require the actual reduction of the categories of PNR data that is transferred. Further, on the basis of proportionality, any new agreement must also reduce the retention period. There is a wide variance in opinion as to what would be proportional, but it certainly must be less than fifteen years.309 The best outcome would likely be a retention period of between five and six years which would bring the new agreement in line with the 2004 Agreement with the United States as well as the current draft agreement with Australia. 310 Additionally, the new agreement must eliminate the criticisms of all other EU-US PNR agreements. The method of transfer should be exclusively push thereby eliminating the any ability of the United States to pull data from European airlines. It is also vitally important that EU citizens have knowledge of their data being transferred as well as access to their records in order to ensure their adequacy and accuracy. 3 12 "PNR data is unverified information, mostly provided by the passengers themselves or their tour operators or travel agencies and collected for business purposes, not law enforcement purposes. As there is no (easy) way to objectively verify these data, PNR data cannot be considered as exact information." 3 13 Based on this assessment, a subject's access to his or her records and data are necessary not just on account of this being a fundamental right, 314 but also for the effectiveness of data use. This is a point which US authorities ought to willingly agree being that any effective use of such data is contingent on the data being correct. If the people do not have access to the data or the ability to ramify any errors, the data becomes useless. US denial of concession to this point would be illogical.
The negotiation of a new EU-US PNR agreement based on these suggestions is not without problems. Agreement. 315 It seems likely that any reduction to any of the terms stated in the 2007 Agreement would be considered by the United States to "degrade the usefulness of the PNR data for identifying terrorists and other dangerous criminals" and thereby compel DHS rejection of the agreement.
16
The other major obstacle is that the entirety of all EU-US PNR relations has been dominated by the United States who has basically disregarded any notion of actual negotiation to conform to EU demands or to comply with EU laws.
3 17 Tony Bunyan of Statewatch, a group which keeps track of civil liberties across all of Europe, stated:
Secret minutes of EU-US meetings since 2001 show that they have always been a one-way channel, with the US setting the agenda by making demands on the EU[.] When the EU does make rare requests, like on data protection, because US law only offers protection and redress to US citizens, they are bluntly told that the US is not going to change its data protection system -as they were at the EU-US JHA ministerial meeting in Washington on 8-9
December 2010.318
Yet another obstacle is that the United States entered into several bilateral agreements with different EU Member States which condition admission into the US Visa Waiver Program on those Member States providing the United States with PNR data. 319 Being that these PNR transfers are based on the 2007 Agreement's provisions, any degradation in the new agreement would seriously threaten these bilateral agreements.
32 0 The last and perhaps most problematic obstacle is that, both logistically and politically, it would be wildly unpopular and almost unthinkable that the EU would rescind an agreement which so recently entered into force and which was the culmination of nearly two years of negotiations.
However, the EU needs to stand their ground against the United States. The EU is really the "only legal check on the actions of the United States" being that they have the political clout and affluence necessary to control the United States in the international arena.
32 ' What is more important than the EU asserting their position in the international political sphere, is the EU's need to limit the inevitable fallout
